to become a Kesselwäscher-a 'vat washer'-with the easier life that such a promotion ostensibly portended.
Levi's texts-along with those of other Holocaust survivors such as Viktor Frankl, Ka-Tzetnik and Imre Kertész-are populated by any number of Schepschels.
3 These authors caustically scorn these Schepschels; but all the while they refrain from denouncing them or locating in their desperate conduct any diffusion of responsibility from the Nazis. In Levi's own words: 'I know of no human tribunals to which one could delegate the judgment.' 4 Each of these authors captures-divergently yet delicately-the essence of humanity as good and evil, differently on different days. The literary format of their texts, to be clear, does not oblige them to pardon or punish. This format thereby nourishes the freedom to address the reality that, in times of atrocity, the divide between victimisers and victims blurs. Literary accounts of atrocity unpack the subtleties of and contiguities among victims and perpetrators, including betrayals, loyalties, connivances and acts of resistance. These accounts memorialise a pressing story of atrocity that carries great meaning for many survivors.
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Criminal law, on the other hand, spurns any such blurring. The representational iconography, and the symbolic economy, of the criminal law is one of finality, disjuncture and category: guilty or not-guilty, persecuted or persecutor, abused or abuser, right or wrong, powerful or powerless. Judicial accounts tend to be austere. Victims are to be pure and ideal; perpetrators are to be unadulterated and ugly. International criminal law hinges upon these antipodes which, in turn, come to fuel its existence. Contrived as they are, these binaries nonetheless undermine international criminal law's ability to speak in other than a crude register, in particular when it comes to the collective nature of mass atrocity. 6 Victims, after all, may be imperfect. Perpetrators may be tragic. The 3 How to class these works? With the exception of Ka-Tzetnik's, they are not fiction, although they deploy narrative techniques associated with novels. These works are also auto-biographical. They are ethnographic in that they reflect a thick description born out of the most poignant of participant observation. Ka-Tzetnik's work, while grounded in what has been experienced, enters the realm of the fictional. Other writers, whose oeuvre this article does not discuss, also have engaged with the Kapo-for example, Art Spiegelman's Maus. 6 As Sofia Stolk notes in her work on opening statements in international criminal trials, '[t] he defendant is depicted as a truly despicable person, which is contrasted with the innocence of the victims.' S Stolk, 'Ntaganda at the ICC-Some observations from the public gallery', Center for International Criminal Justice, 14 September 2015, available at https://cicj.org/2015/09/the-opening-shapeshifting of humanity in times of violent cataclysm, however, does not mix or play well with criminal law's absolutes. Unlike Levi, Israeli legislators and courts did judge some of the Schepschels. They did so in the 1950s and 1960s in a series of national trials called the Kapo trials. The term Kapo refers to inmates-initially German professional criminals or political prisoners, then prisoners of war, but then, later, also persecuted Jews-who served as guards in the camps and, in turn, received a putative 'privileged status'. 7 Kapos were inmate functionaries whose day-today supervision enabled the camps, even sprawling ones, to run with comparatively few SS overseers. They were key cogs in the Nazi policy of 'prisoner selfadministration'. Kapos exercised their limited agency at times in empathetic ways, at other times to resist, but also to hurt and savage others under their charge. Kapos themselves were hierarchically organised-from a chief Kapo down to the barrack commander (Blockältester) and even lower, ending with the Sonderkommando, those inmates engaged to extract teeth and shear hairmutilations undertaken for the purposes of supplying the Reich-from the dead after the SS gassings and then to burn the bodies in the crematoria. While many Kapos were compelled to serve, others made their services available-at times readily. The recruitment of the persecuted as agents of the Final Solution exposes the totalising perfidy of Nazi eliminationism. Pitting victims against victims broke solidarity and metastasized extirpation within the targeted group. A detainee's status as a Kapo was fragile. Demotion was always possible. An erstwhile Kapo could be expelled back into the ranks of the ordinary prisoners, in which case he or she might face a most uncertain fate. Despite the contingency of their status, Kapos wielded enormous power over their subjects. Authority, after all, is situational. Relatedly, in the ghettos throughout Eastern Europe, Jews served as police officers and administrators. These individuals were also prosecuted in the Kapo trials. Following the liberation of the camps, survivors attacked Kapos and police officers; some Kapos were prosecuted in informal proceedings that were conducted, but only at times thoughtfully, in displaced persons camps in Europe. 8 The Israeli Kapo trials, therefore, map onto a history of summary trials and, in a sense, may have helped expiate anger in chance encounters that occurred between Kapos and regular prisoners on the sunny streets of Tel Aviv, for example, a decade later. The records of many of the Kapo trials have been sealed (for seventy years as of the time of the judgment); 9 records of other trials were destroyed in a flood. Still, enough evidence regarding these trials seeps into the public frame to expose the clumsiness that the criminal law experiences in explicating the victim/victimiser divide as prevalent in Levi's 'grey zone'. The murkiness and fragmentation of the 'grey zone' became embarrassing and discomfiting once refracted through the lens of the criminal law. Notwithstanding this awkwardness, the criminal law continues to garner even greater status as the iconic-and infatuated-manner in which to deliver accountability for mass atrocity. Courtrooms and jailhouses have become indelibly associated with international law's linear progress narrative. The inflation of international criminal law's ambit ironically may exacerbate the struggle to narrate how and through whom atrocity actually occurs. The criminal law condemns, but fails to actuate the granularity of survivors' stories.
The pursuit of justice, meaning and transition in the wake of the Holocaust is not self-contained. The variance between Holocaust writing and Holocaust judging-as evidenced in the dénouement of the Kapo proceedings-conveys pedagogic value for transitional reckoning in the wake of other atrocities, including atrocities that fall within the jurisdiction of contemporary international judicial institutions.
Is the criminal law's gaucheness in the Kapo trials, however, a congenital condition? Although particularly constrained in the invidiousness of the Nazi concentration camps, the capacity of victims to victimise arises wherever atrocity metastasizes; so, too, does the hunger of survivors to memorialise the 10 Ongwen is paradoxically accused of committing crimes that he himself suffered after having been abducted into the LRA while walking home from school: the war crime of cruel treatment, conscription and use as a child soldier, and the crime against humanity of enslavement. Ugandans wrestle with his victim/perpetrator duality, leading to debates about where and how-and, even, if-he should be criminally prosecuted. These debates thereby bear witness to some of the themes that had bedevilled the Kapo trials. They also touch upon documentary concerns as to how best to understand, conceptualise and remember LRA violence. Which stories, and whose, to authenticate? And why? In late March 2016, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed charges-many charges, including for sexual and gender-based crimes-against Ongwen. The tone and content of the confirmation of charges decision, while ensuring that the criminal law advances, do not augur well for the prospect that criminal fora can accommodate the diversity of stories about his coming of age in the LRA, his deployment of violence, and the suffering of those he harmed. This article nonetheless persists in considering a number of criminal procedure sites, including sentencing, as potential venues for such accommodation and, thereby, as pivots to facilitate broader didactic, pedagogic and explanatory ambitions. Whereas much of expressive theory focuses on criminal law's ability to narrate norms and prohibitions, this article probes its ability to unpack the aetiology of mass violence and the discursive content of what survivors wish to remember. This article therefore considers how, if at all, criminal proceedings against Ongwen might achieve aetiological expressive purposes. Such purposes include narrating his coming of age in northern Uganda in order to educate the public about child soldering, agency, victim-perpetrator concatenation and the malleability of power. Ultimately, this article considers criminal law's ability in this regard to be rather thin.
Survivors may wish to remember what they endured, and how they suffered, at the hands of others who, too, were persecuted. The ability of literary and cinematographic accounts to deliver this content helps expiate the 'ethical loneliness' that tormented victims victimised by other victims. 'Ethical loneliness', a condition identified and a term coined by philosopher Jill Stauffer, reflects the double experience of being abandoned by humanity only to be followed up by not being heard-truly heard-when talking about what happened.
11 An ethically lonely person is rendered invisible; the alienation is all the more embedded because no one is listening well. Stauffer adroitly identifies many instances of ethical loneliness within and without the transitional justice context. Examples include victims pressured into reconciliation and disavowed of their resentment; survivors stripped of their expressed agency and ventriloquised as passive; and when the pursuit of microscopic facts in an atrocity trial pushes broader narratives of structural injustice aside. I see deep ethical loneliness in survivors of Kapo violence; just as I see deep ethical loneliness in the child (or adult) brutalised by a child soldier; just as I see ethical loneliness (and great fear of becoming ethically lonely) in those who survived Ongwen's assaults. In these instances, the harm suffered is no less painful, but the characteristics of the aggressor are such that the injury becomes awkwardly told, feebly under-told, ignored outright or sensationalised. Can criminal trials of victim-victimisers expiate ethical loneliness? This article is sceptical. This goal may be too nuanced to square with the reductionist pressures of the courtroom; too delicate to outlast the adversarialism that inheres between prosecution and defence where the winner takes all; and perhaps too distant from other aspirations such as deterrence, retribution and incapacitation. Where then-and how-to capture the ethical loneliness of the victim of Kapo brutality, of the beneficiary of Kapo mercy, and of the Kapo tormented by his or her own nightmares?
Experiences with the Kapo trials might provide a way to re-cast the current proceedings against Ongwen. This article, however, ultimately discourages criminal prosecutions of victim-perpetrators. It instead encourages international criminal law to recede, rather than to regale, and in turn to welcome stories as told diversely through multiple formats.
I M P E R F E C T S U F F E R I N G
In Se questo è un uomo, written in 1947 immediately upon his repatriation to Italy, Primo Levi backgrounds the structural injustices of the concentration camps in order to foreground the day-to-day interactions among inmates.
12 Levi certainly -track Levi's by foregrounding the disposition of the inmate rather than the inevitability of circumstance.
For Levi, Auschwitz is strategy: clinical, primordial and survivalist. Kertész, to be sure, also survived. He plotted in the spaces available to him-he benefitted from chance and from friendship. But, fundamentally, Kertész sought ownership not so much of his trajectory but of how he felt along that trajectory. Kertész was determined that his world neither be fated nor fateless. His agency is that of recollection: to move on and transcend. It is also that of the dissident-of finding fleeting happiness in the Lager and glimmers of nostalgia thereafter. He recalls the sunset as the best time of the day. Kertész's embarrassment is that no one may ever come to ask of the good times in the camps. His goal is memory (or revision)-how to make sense of the past, and how to communicate the awkward experience that shards of joy sparkle even within the most appalling of conditions. To be sure, Kertész unpacks the pain. He shares, for example, in grim detail how his wooden shoes melded to his feet amid the glue of pus, oedema and mud. But he refuses to permit the pain to entirely define him or his experiences. For Ka-Tzetnik, on the other hand, the painstarvations, beatings, rapes, scarification, brothels, cannibalism-visited upon the bodies and souls of the inmates is luridly omnipresent.
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Frankl, for his part, drills down into the vision that no one, no matter how constrained, is ever bereft of agency. For Frankl, agency lies in how one responds to the impossible, to the implausible and to the unimaginable. 19 Frankl, the murderous instincts to which hunger, deprivation, and humiliation give rise, the fall of those who under other circumstances would have been the most admired members of a community.'). Ka-Tzetnik is the nom de plume of Yehiel Dinur, who also testified at the Eichmann trial in a fashion that did not meet the formal requirements of legally probative, or even admissible, evidence. Paradoxically, however, Frankl also propounds strategy-which forms the essence of his ensuing logotherapy. He insists that what distinguishes the drowned from the saved-to invoke Levi's terms-is that the saved have a purpose, they retain hope in the future and can imagine that future, whereas the drowned have given up: in a wrenching passage, Frankl says they hardly move, lie in their own excreta, and nothing bothers them anymore. 21 KaTzetnik, for his part, embraces the drowned-the Musselmänner, no more (nor less) than mere living skeletons-and, writing from their perspective, garishly depicts their suffering, all the while toggling between the actual and the imaginary and between the lived and the conjured. The fragments of the imaginary, however, may well constitute a stenography of what has been experienced. Frankl is opinionated. He is exigent. He maintains that there is a 'right way' or an 'honorable way' to endure one's sufferings. 22 Suffering conveys meaning; the challenge of the human condition is not what we experience but how we respond to our experiences. Frankl posits:
The way in which a man accepts his fate and all the suffering it entails, the way in which he takes up his cross, gives him ample opportunityeven under the most difficult circumstances-to add a deeper meaning to his life. It may remain brave, dignified and unselfish. Or in the bitter fight for self-preservation he may forget his human dignity and become no more than an animal.
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offered the opportunity to make a decision, a decision which determined whether you would or would not submit to those powers which threatened to rob you of your very self, your inner freedom; which determined whether or not you would become the plaything of circumstance, renouncing freedom and dignity to become molded into the form of a typical inmate. ' Frankl (2006) 67.
20 Ibid 5-6 ('On the average, only those prisoners could keep alive who, after years of trekking from camp to camp, had lost all scruples in their fight for existence; they were prepared to use every means, honest and otherwise, even brutal force, theft, and betrayal of their friends, in order to save themselves.').
21 Ibid 74.
22 Ibid 38.
Like Levi, Frankl nonetheless balks at condemning the ethics of those who spin machinations to survive and who thereby fail to suffer rightly or honourably. Frankl flatly rejects collective guilt. He does so theoretically as well as personally-choosing as he did to return to Vienna after the Holocaust to the same community that had previously shunned him. Frankl accords his own survival to the need of one Kapo to unburden his mental anguish upon him; the resultant confessional and therapeutic conversations safeguarded Frankl's life. And Frankl played that game, to be sure, which in retrospect he drenches with sarcasm: 'I was very happy to be the personally appointed physician to His Honor the Capo, and to march in the first row at an even pace.' 24 Frankl's account, however, is not only about the inmates. He also gestures towards the German guards. Frankl locates agency within the guards themselves: discretion that can be turned towards excessive sadism, towards dullness or towards pity. Frankl concludes, in a passage of brutalist equivalence:
It is apparent that the mere knowledge that a man was either a camp guard or a prisoner tells us almost nothing. Human kindness can be found in all groups, even those which as a whole it would be easy to condemn. The boundaries between groups overlapped and we must not try to simplify matters by saying that these men were angels and those were devils. Certainly, it was a considerable achievement for a guard or foreman to be kind to the prisoners in spite of all the camp's influences, and, on the other hand, the baseness of a prisoner who treated his own companions badly was exceptionally contemptible.
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Levi evokes the constant prospect he faces of other inmates stealing his pathetic food rations and his blankets and clothing and shoes. So much can be lost so quickly, a tragedy which Levi ascertains early on:
We have learnt . . . that everything can be stolen, in fact is automatically stolen as soon as attention is relaxed; and to avoid this, we had to learn the art of sleeping with our head on a bundle made up of our jacket and containing all our belongings, from the bowl to the shoes.
26
This theft is painful, omnipresent and pitiless. It robs the residue from those who remain, thereby shattering any vestige of solidarity:
[I]f one goes to the latrine or the washroom, everything has to be carried along, always and everywhere, and while one washes one's face, We now invite the reader to contemplate the possible meaning in the Lager of the words 'good' and 'evil', 'just' and 'unjust'; let everybody judge, on the basis of the picture we have outlined and of the examples given above, how much of our ordinary moral world could survive on this side of the barbed wire.
31
The point is not to condemn the saved or pity the drowned, but rather to admit that in the Lager 'the struggle to survive is without respite' 32 and that someone's survival may hinge upon another's demise. It is not all, or exclusively, about chance or luck but-at times-design, scheming and gaming. Those who drown, Levi points out, are those who 'carry out all the orders one receives, to eat only the ration, to observe the discipline of the work and 27 Ibid 34.
28 Those Sonderkommando who outlived Auschwitz were among the few to memorialise-through words and art-the ways of the crematoria.
29 Levi (1993) 45 ('The Kapo arrives, he distributes kicks, punches and abuse, and the comrades disperse like chaff in the wind. Null Achtzehn puts his hand to his nose and blankly looks at it, dirty with blood. I only receive two blows on the head, of the sort that do no harm but simply stun.').
30 Ibid 49. See also Wood (2015) ('[Levi] places in the gray zone all those who were morally compromised by some degree of collaboration with the Germans-from the lowliest (those prisoners who got a little extra food by performing menial jobs like sweeping or being night watchmen) through the more ambiguous (the Kapos, often thuggish enforcers and guards who were themselves also prisoners) to the utterly tragic (the Sonderkommandos, Jews employed for a few months to run the gas chambers and crematoria, until they themselves were killed').
31 Levi (1993) 86.
the camp'. 33 The drowned have no story other than Ka-Tzetnik's. The path ahead-though Frankl would not say forward-is that which leads to the Prominenz, a collective that Levi sees as 'monsters of asociality and insensitivity'. In a devastating passage, Levi recounts the balefulness of those who successfully strategise survival:
[I]f one offers a position of privilege to a few individuals in a state of slavery, exacting in exchange the betrayal of a natural solidarity with their comrades, there will certainly be someone who will accept. . . .
[H]e will only be satisfied when he has unloaded on to his underlings the injury received from above. We are aware that this is very distant from the picture that is usually given of the oppressed who unite, if not in resistance, at least in suffering.
34
The downtrodden exert a thread of agency when they tread-whether as tactic, desperation or deprivation-upon others below.
This agency recurs in Holocaust remembrance. In the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam, for example, a video plays of Hannah Goslar, Anne's dear childhood friend. A Paraguayan national, and thereby slightly protected by virtue of her state's relationship with Germany, Hannah ends up as a slave worker but does not get sent to a death camp. She labours next to Anne's camp. She learns that Anne is nearby. Through word of mouth, the two girls furtively meet up at night near the fence that separates their camps. They call to each other in the darkness. Anne is weak. Hannah is better fed. Hannah collects little Red Cross packages, along with scraps of food, from her own camp-mates. She bags the provisions. She and Anne agree to yet another meeting. Hannah throws the package over the fence in the darkness. Anne is there, but she cries out in agony: the woman next to her grabbed the package, stole it and ran away. Anne is left with nothing. Hannah tries again, another night, and this time she succeeds in getting some food to Anne.
Levi recognises that survival is conditioned on the need to 'resist enemies and have no pity for rivals'. 35 which, he bitterly remarks, betray him by shame. 37 His final days in the abandoned camp essentially involve barring migrating masses from his barracks in order for him to live on. Yet, the taste of survival strategems grows rancid through time. Levi mordantly scuttles an inmate-whom he calls Henri-and belittles him as soiling his soul in order to cling to life. Henri, as it would turn out, did survive. His actual name is Paul Steinberg and he, too, later penned a memoir of his own experiences in Auschwitz.
38 Steinberg vaguely concurs with Levi's assessment of his conduct, but queries whether it is truly pitiful to pounce upon survival. The bounty of virtue, however, persists for Levi. For example, Levi's love for Lorenzo-the Italian day labourer who saved him by passing on rations and food-warms his pages: 'Thanks to Lorenzo, I managed not to forget that I myself was a man.' 39 After the war, Levi tracks Lorenzo, by then terribly ill with alcoholism, and without success tries to heal him. brought. Insofar as there were no Nazis in Israel at the time, the purpose of the law was to target Jewish Holocaust survivors suspected of collaboration. The only German Nazi tried under this law was Adolf Eichmann, whose transfer into Israeli jurisdiction was of course highly controversial. John Demjanjuk, a Ukrainian-born, concentration-camp guard, and SS volunteer, who had been captured by the Germans as a prisoner-of-war, was also tried under the law in the late 1980s. 43 He was prosecuted following his deportation to Israel from the US (where he had emigrated and was an auto worker). The dénouement of the Demjanjuk trial proved an 'embarrassment' to Israel's legal system; the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law has since remained unused.
T H E F U T I L I T Y O F I S R A E L ' S K A P O T R I A L S
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The Israeli Justice Minister presented the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law to the first Knesset as follows:
We may safely assume that Nazi criminals . . . will not venture to Israel, but the law also applies to those who implemented the Nazis' will, and unfortunately some of them may be in our midst . . . . Hopefully the proposed law will contribute to cleansing the air among the survivors who have immigrated to Eretz Israel.
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The 1950 Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law included an array of offences. The major offences, which entailed a mandatory death penalty, were crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The legislation proscribed five other offences: crimes against persecuted persons, offences in places of confinement, delivering persecuted persons to enemy administration, blackmailing persecuted persons and membership in an enemy organisation. These latter offences did not trigger the death penalty. Only one of the Jewish defendants convicted in the Kapo trials was found guilty of a major offence. No Jewish defendant ever was charged with crimes against the Jewish people. 46 The crime of 'offences in places of confinement'
(article 4(a) of the legislation) was specifically designed to deal with Kapo 43 Demjanjuk ultimately was acquitted in Israel on charges of having been a guard at Treblinka. In 2011, he was tried and convicted in Germany as an accessory to mass murder as a guard at Sobibó r. He appealed. He died during the appeal process. Hence, his conviction was never validated. The legal theories deployed to try Demjanjuk in Germany have inspired other subsequent prosecutions of former concentration camp guards and officials. For his part, Demjanjuk argued that he was like a Jewish Kapo-that he should be seen as a victim injured by the Nazis. actions in ghettos and concentration camps that fell short of major crimes.
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The 1950 Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law did not formally distinguish between the Nazis and their collaborators, even when collaborators were persecuted persons. Its quest for condemnation, finitude and clarity effectively constructed the persecuted Jew as a Nazi. The law thereby dispelled any 'grey zone'. The Kapo trials were controversial. Orna Ben-Naftali and Yogev Tuval note that, at the time they were rendered, only six of the judgments were deemed by Israeli editors to be of sufficient public interest to be published. 48 The unpublished judgments in the State Archive were sealed in a 1995 order for a period of seventy years as of the date of the judgment. Sealing those judgments found in the State Archive-an unorthodox move-has, according to BenNaftali and Tuval, 'expunged [them] from public memory' and has led to 'deliberate collective forgetting'. 49 Unpublished judgments in the courts' archives were destroyed by a flood. 50 Observing the dearth of publications in
Hebrew that relate to these trials, Ben-Naftali and Tuval-writing in 2006-additionally remark:
The subject is not part of the curriculum in the Israeli educational system. Indeed, over the past four years, we have regularly asked students at the law school whether they are familiar with these trials. -might vivify public discourse in Israel on the Kapo trials. Perhaps these recent contributions will drain some of the discomfort that permeates these conversations.
What cannot be drained, however, is the palpable clumsiness of the Kapo trials. Shoehorning realities of victims as victimisers into a juridical framework proved to be frustrating; justiciability was slippery; refusing to distinguish the Nazis from persecuted collaborators proved far too crude, in particular, when it came to small fry such as the Kapos; appellate interventions were extensive; and, while judges were of different minds, 56 the verdicts squirm with disquiet about the delegated task at hand. Punishing the Kapo, it was remarked, somehow diminished Nazi guilt. 57 Judges at times used harsh language to denounce the accused, but they paradoxically deployed tonalities of clemency, empathy and mercy when it came to assessing culpability and pronouncing sentence. 58 In the Enigster case-which involved one of the most brutal Kapos in which duress was rejected as a defence-two judges still remarked that having to punish made their 'heart tremble[]'. 59 In Beisky, the judges called the Kapo 'a human worm' but then sentenced him to five years' imprisonment at trial, a punishment that was subsequently reduced to two years on appeal. 60 adjudicate the case of Barnblatt, a Jewish police commander (formerly a pianist and conductor) in a Polish ghetto, remarked that the question raised was 'for history and not for the court', 61 thereby cloaking it as fundamentally non-justiciable. Barnblatt was initially convicted and given a five-year sentence. In 1964 (after the Eichmann trial, incidentally), however, his conviction was reversed on appeal and he was acquitted of all charges on the basis of duress. On appeal, it was observed how 'presumptuous' and 'self-righteous' it would be 'to be critical of these "small people" who were incapable of transcending into an ultimate level of morality'. 62 And, what is more:
[C]riminal law prohibitions, including the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators law, were not written for exceptional heroes, but for ordinary mortals, with their ordinary weaknesses.
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The first Kapo trial involved a Jewish policeman in the Ostrovitz ghetto in Poland; it ended in an acquittal. Elsa Trank, a Birkenau women's camp block commander (aged 18 at the time) who became an ice cream seller, was sentenced to two years' imprisonment following extensive evidence of the abuses she inflicted. The judges commented how she, too, was persecuted like the others. Since she had been arrested two years previously, she was promptly released upon conviction for time served.
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The Kapo judgments were riddled with 'discrepanc[ies] between the harsh language that the courts often used to describe the acts of the accused and the relatively mild sentence that they finally delivered'. 65 While understandable, and indicative of how the new Israeli judiciary exercised its independence, these discrepancies led to gnarly and queasy text that, in turn, radiates the challenges that inhere in judging Kapo conduct within the reductionist strictures of the criminal law. To be sure, the process of prosecution generated information and testimony. Documents from the Kapo trials offered glimpses into life as experienced in the camps. On the other hand, according to Ben-Naftali and Tuval, these documents 'fail to record . . . reflection upon and understanding of the meaning of these experiences'. 66 The trials did not explicate the 'grey zone', saturated as it is with morally ambiguous conduct. Ben-Naftali and Tuval posit that the judges felt 'the unconscious yet nagging sense of their impotentia judicandi'; these authors conclude that the Kapo trials 'do not reveal the power of law; on the contrary, these cases expose the limits of law'. 67 These authors further unpack how common devices of legal reasoning-argument by analogy, treating like cases alike, leanness of language, eschewing doubt and imposing rationalityare ill-suited to draw meaning from, or simply recollect, the Holocaust.
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Although recognising how some of the Kapo judgments strove to elucidate a deeper sense of meaning, and providing examples thereof, Ben-Naftali and Tuval remain sharply circumspect about the criminal law's fundamental capacity to attain these ends. Nor is the penological purpose of the Kapo trials evident: in other words, did they serve deterrent, retributive or protective goals? They may, however, have expiated vigilante attacks when ordinary prisoner and Kapo crossed paths on streets, on buses and in the theatre.
P R O S E C U T I N G A F O R M E R C H I L D S O L D I E R A S A N E N E M Y O F H U M A N K I N D
'Each of us sin in words, deeds, and thoughts. Each of us sin in different ways. If I committed a crime through war, I am sorry. In my mind, I thought war was the best thing. Even up to now, I dream about war every night. But if they don't want to forgive me, I leave it in their hands. I have become like a lice, which you remove from your hair or waist and kill without any resistance.' -Dominic Ongwen, interviewed before being handed over to the ICC
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The LRA operated for some decades in northern Uganda. While violence has laced Uganda since the country's independence in 1962, including the ruthlessness of Idi Amin, the armed conflict between the LRA and the Ugandan government was particularly protracted. 70 (2015) 6. See also ibid 5 for reporting another survey according to which the LRA has abducted 54 000 to 75 000 people, including 25 000 to 38 000 children, since 1986.
72 Ibid 1. See also ibid 12 (discussing the fathers of children born in captivity in the LRA, and noting a 'blurring of the lines between perpetrator and victim' in that 'low-ranking LRA commanders who had forced marriages and fathered children . . . highlight how they were also abducted at very young ages and became victims of a system and structure that forced then to take on a wife or wives . . . and to bear children as part of an LRA strategy to grow its ranks'). If anyone is to be tried, it should be the early members of the LRA, the ones who volunteered to fight and swelled their ranks with children they abducted and indoctrinated, Odong says. They are the ones who forced 14-year-old Ongwen to become a killer in order to save his own life, he says. Many of these former fighters are now walking free in Gulu town, recipients of an amnesty that his nephew has been denied.
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A few child soldiers are like Ongwen and rise in the ranks to become commanders. 83 The vast majority do not. Yet it is impossible to disentangle who Ongwen is today from where he began in the LRA. Ongwen is a prime candidate for what criminologists might call the 'rotten social background' defence. 84 Although Ongwen is being tried as an adult for what he did as an adult, he remains the youngest person in ICC custody. Ongwen's character is enigmatic in other ways. He was mercurial. He was prone to anger and rage, but also exhibited mercy and gentleness. Ongwen pleaded with Kony not to have Vincent Otti (another LRA leader) executed because Otti had encouraged peace negotiations. 85 Otti had been Ongwen's lapwony (teacher) following his abduction into the LRA. The teaching was brutal. It involved routine beatings and abusive punishments for all sorts of bizarre infractions; Ongwen was told his family had died, was instructed to forget his past and was compelled to torment and torture other children. Kony lorded over everyone, including Ongwen. 87 Kony threatened to execute Ongwen on three occasions. 88 Ultimately, Ongwen did escape the LRAbarefoot and barely clothed, assisted by a friendly guard-after Kony had him arrested and tortured in southern Darfur. 89 Among Ongwen's legal arguments raised (unsuccessfully) at the confirmation of charges hearing was that rank in the LRA was essentially a misnomer, or meant nothing more than a raw measure of how well one survived, since Kony controlled everything and defrocked and executed putative commanders. Ongwen 'permitted' several of his concubines to escape with his many children. Florence Ayot, one of his 'bush wives', now calls for Ongwen to come home to Uganda and benefit from the amnesty the government gave LRA fighters to end the war.
90 She says he was, just like her, taken into the LRA at 'a tender age'. Accordingly, again, just like her and thousands of others, he should be amnestied and forgiven. 91 Ayot remembers Ongwen as a 'fundamentally "goodhearted" person, who fought only to avoid punishment from . . . commanders'. 92 She hopes he can return home to Gulu where she now lives in a one-room hut; if he found work, she adds, perhaps he might be able to pay for their children's school fees. 93 Gulu is about an hour's drive from Coorom.
Official amnesties played a pivotal role in weakening the LRA and demobilising many of its fighters. These amnesties extended immunity from prosecution to LRA fighters, called 'reporters', who lay down their weapons. Uganda's Supreme Court has determined the national amnesty law to be 379419891/international-criminal-court-to-try-former-child-soldier-with-war-crimes> (last visited 20 May 2016).
87 See Cakaj (2016) ('[I]t must be particularly frustrating for [Ongwen] to be compared to Joseph Kony, a man whose clutches Ongwen has tried to escape for at least the last decade.').
88 Ibid ('Kony said he did not want to kill him because his sister, also abducted at a young age, was one of Kony's favorite wives.'). legal. 94 In 2015, it held that this law does not contravene Uganda's international obligations because it abstains from granting a blanket amnesty for all crimes. In this decision, the Ugandan Supreme Court also ruled that decisions by national authorities to prosecute Thomas Kwoyelo, an LRA colonel who had previously sought an amnesty, were equally constitutional. 95 Kwoyelo had argued, successfully before the Ugandan Constitutional Court, that he suffered discrimination because the Ugandan authorities failed to grant him an amnesty when other individuals in circumstances similar to his had routinely received an amnesty. The Ugandan Supreme Court, a level higher, disagreed. It held that amnesties cannot be granted for grave crimes as recognised under international law, specifically, crimes committed against innocent communities or civilians. The Supreme Court determined that such crimes, in fact, fall outside the scope of the amnesty legislation itself, which only covers crimes that are committed in furtherance or cause of the war or armed rebellion. The Supreme Court also ruled that Ugandan prosecutors have the discretion to decide whether to prosecute someone who applies for an amnesty. No discrimination claim can be made; whether another individual received an amnesty is immaterial to any given individual's case. This works both ways, too: once the Prosecution grants an amnesty, according to the Supreme Court, the assumption is made that the recipient of the amnesty properly falls within the scope of the legislation. Hence, depending on prosecutorial discretion, were Ongwen to be in Uganda (rather than at the ICC) he could be prosecuted or he could receive an amnesty. That said, under the prevailing interpretation of the amnesty legislation, it would seem implausible to interpret the evidence against Ongwen, if proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as failing to implicate crimes committed against innocent civilians or communities. The amnesty therefore lies out of his reach. It remains so even though thousands of other fighters have grabbed it. Some Ugandans, however, doggedly believe that Ongwen should receive an amnesty and participate in reintegration ceremonies. These feelings are strongest in Ongwen's home region. Ongwen apparently surrendered expecting to receive an amnesty. 96 He reacted indignantly to the ICC proceedings pending against him:
94 Uganda vs. Thomas Kwoyelo, Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 2012 (8 April 2015 .
95 Kwoyelo reportedly joined the LRA as a minor at the age of 15.
96 Green (2015) .
I was captured at a tender age, and went there as someone who was blind and deaf. It is the same way in which I returned. And I hope my good intention will be reciprocated by the responsible authorities.
97
It is also lost on some observers why Ongwen should be indicted and prosecuted, rather than other commanders. While selectivity remains an inherent foible of international criminal law, the shadow it casts over the Ongwen proceedings seems to be particularly long.
On the other hand, many other Ugandans, including other former child soldiers, insist that Ongwen 'went overboard' and should be punished.
98 They see him as having pursued extreme violence and sadism as a way to achieve power, status and influence within the LRA. Calls for Ongwen to face trial and severe punishment abound in areas such as Lukodi, scarred by the violence he and his forces allegedly committed, although in Lukodi the primary concern of community members reportedly lies in receiving compensation for their losses. 99 That said, in both Coorom and Lukodi, an assessment survey also reveals the 'great importance' of 'reconciliation and traditional justice'. 100 On a broader note, many northern Ugandans blame the Ugandan government for the violence, for forcible resettlement, for not controlling the LRA, and for not protecting communities.
Ongwen's path, in any event, was not the desperate one of the Kapos nor that of Schepschel to join the Kesselwäscher, but rather was somewhat more ambitious. He led many attacks against civilians. He was the youngest LRA officer (28 years old at the time) that Kony promoted to Brigadier. 101 Ongwen's path illustrates the circulatory nature of the victim-victimiser spectrum. Might Ongwen's imminent trial leverage itself to further the narrative function of unpacking the complexities of child soldiering, which international law increasingly understands as applying to persons under the age of eighteen who are associated with armed forces or armed groups? At present, child soldiering remains a poorly understood scourge particularly susceptible to simplistic thinking. This is because child soldiering is entangled in the binary 97 Akena (2015) . 100 Ibid. See also, ICTJ (2015) 12-13 (calling for accountability for sexual violence in northern Uganda, but also noting that 'in many cases those who were abducted into the LRA may have committed violations, their status is complicated by the fact that they were forced into that context in violation of their own rights. Therefore individual responsibility for violations does not fit into a simplified victim-perpetrator binary, but needs to be contextualised and nuanced.'). My investigation demonstrates that Dominic Ongwen served as a high ranking commander within the LRA and that he is amongst those who bear the greatest responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. His transfer to the Court's custody sends a firm and unequivocal message that no matter how long it will take, the Office of the Prosecutor will not stop until the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community are prosecuted and face justice for their heinous crimes.
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In the end, as I have argued elsewhere, 104 the international legal imagination is beguiled by chronological bright lines-whether fifteen or, increasingly, eighteen-that deliver the comfort of simplicity but belie a much coarser reality. These condensed attitudes, and disclaiming of subtleties, persist as the Ongwen case advances. Irrespective of how high he ascended, the fact remains that Ongwen's point of entry remains fixed as a young, kidnapped, orphaned and abused child. Ongwen's defence team invoked this point of entry in its submissions in the confirmation of charges hearing. The defence team submitted that coming of age in the LRA amounts to a kind of institutionalised duress that excludes criminal responsibility under Rome Statute article 31(1) rather than just mitigating sentence. 105 According to the defence, Ongwen 'lived most of his life under duress (i.e. from the age of 9.5 years old)' and his 'so-called rank was demonstrative of one thing: that he was surviving better than others while under duress'. Pre-Trial Chamber II rejected this argument. It held that 'the circumstances of Ongwen's stay in the LRA . . . cannot be said to be beyond his control.' Pre-Trial Chamber II concluded that 'escapes from the LRA were not rare.' It underscored that Ongwen 'could have chosen not to rise in hierarchy and expose himself to increasingly higher responsibility to implement policies'. It added that the evidence demonstrates that Ongwen 'shared the ideology of the LRA, including its brutal and perverted policy with respect to civilians'. PreTrial Chamber II noted that Ongwen could 'have avoided raping' forced wives, 'or, at the very least, he could have reduced the brutality of the sexual abuse'. The Pre-Trial Chamber in Ongwen thereby shifted from the narrativeforcefully articulated by the ICC's Trial and Appeals Chambers in the preceding Lubanga case-of the pernicious, ongoing effect of being compelled as a child into a violent armed group and socialised therein. Lubanga cast the linkage between the past as a child soldier and the present as a former child soldier as linear and continuous. The child soldiering experience was constructed as ongoing and assured: it rendered the children as victims damaged for life, with their reality today as derivative of their previous suffering. Once a child soldier in fact, always a child soldier in mind, body and soul. In Ongwen, however, the linkage between the accused's past as a child soldier and his present as a former child soldier was seen as discontinuous and contingent.
Whereas the defence sought to link Ongwen's conduct as an adult to his experiences as a child, the Pre-Trial Chamber only examined his agency as an adult-as if he had never been a child, let alone a child in the LRA. In rejecting the duress submissions in Ongwen, the Pre-Trial Chamber elided Ongwen's status as a former child soldier. It's as if he lost that status, or ceded it. Hence, there is a proper way to be a victim. Victimhood is contingent, so to speak, even aleatory.
It would be a shame if criminally prosecuting a former child soldier ended up diverting the gaze of the international community from the complexities of child soldiering and the liminality of the process of coming of age. This diversion, however, arises from criminal law's discomfort with victim-perpetrator concatenation.
106 If the defence presents Ongwen only as an innocent child, and the prosecution responds by redlining the fact that Ongwen had entered the LRA as a child and came of age in such a dismal setting, then the result will be to embed the binaries even further. Yet this zero-sum jockeying is what the law expects of its adherents. This is already how the confirmation of charges process-a preliminary step only-has unfolded. Such, in any event, is how the courtroom game is played. And criminal law, through verdict, must give an answer: innocent or guilty. It must condemn, or not.
C O N C L U S I O N : J U S T I C I A B I L I T Y A N D I N V I S I B I L I T Y
Top leaders set the conditions through which atrocity occurs. They structure the incentives. This is why they are conventionally said to bear the greatest responsibility. But the industrialisation of atrocity-its very happening-remains the handiwork of the masses. This collective corvée resonates in survivor recollections. These recollections ooze with the betrayal, compassion, and indifference of murderers, by-standers and side-standers, profiteers, piddlers and idlers. These recollections go so far as to articulate the agency of the persecuted, the tortured and the targeted. One strand that binds many of these stories is the circularity, rather than obversion, of victims and victimisers. The persecuted may persecute and persecutors themselves may become (or already be) the persecuted. Truly understanding atrocity requires an embrace of this bedevilling interstitiality. If prevention flows from comprehension, if justice hinges on accuracy, and if transition involves some appreciation of granularity, then this embrace would activate a much broader normative agenda. At a minimum, it could nourish the development of typologies of atrocity perpetrators-a hugely important task that others have begun to undertake.
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Survivors tell stories-many stories-about transcending atrocity. I hope this article has established the richness of these stories, the disquiet and comfort they generate, and why they matter. Yet, as is evident in the fate of the Kapo trials, these stories may not mesh with law's story-telling capacities. stories may contradict law's angularity. Hence, law fails to authenticate these stories. Law, in fact, may spoil them. But is this condition congenital? Intractable? Must victims remain ideally pure and perpetrators perfectly wicked? Perhaps the performance of international courts and tribunals could be tweaked to transcend reductionism and deliver a richer narrative. Such a move might gesture towards an expressive justification for international criminal trials. The operation of international criminal law would thereby relax its condemnatory and denunciatory functions, which Frankl and Levi repudiate in the case of tragic perpetrators, and aspire towards pedagogic and didactic goals. Whereas much of expressive theory focuses on law's ability to narrate norms and prohibitions, this article suggests that expressive theory might attain aetiological goals, namely, to clarify-rather than occlude-how atrocity spreads and, particularly, the roles that those who are dually victims and perpetrators play in that process.
Taking aetiological expressivism seriously could lead to a rethinking of certain aspects of the mechanics of international criminal process beyond the context of absolute defences, a claim that failed in Ongwen's confirmation of charges decision. Sentencing is an obvious candidate. The 'rotten social background' of a convict could be advanced as a mitigating factor in sentencing in a fashion that depicts victim-perpetrator concatenation. So, too, could duress.
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Sentencing also might engage with the trauma that perpetrators endure. 110 Or, perhaps, a failure to suffer properly 111 could be seen as a failing that ought to aggravate the severity of the sanction. Engaging didactically with the agency of the oppressed, moreover, could enhance the gravity of the conduct for the leaders and commanders who create such oppressive conditions in the first place and, thereby, crystallise this circumstance as aggravating in the sentencing of the most responsible. Yet, throughout all of these instances, the criminal law still remains embedded in punishing, rather than explaining, such that the incorporation of aetiological expressivism would be half-hearted. Pursuit of aetiologically expressive goals might redefine the role of the witness in international criminal proceedings. Hanna Yablonka, for example, concludes that, perhaps contrary to the intent of Israeli legislators, the Kapo 109 Dražen Erdemović, another tragic victim-perpetrator who was among the ICTY's first convicts, was unsuccessful in arguing duress as a defence but was successful in raising it as mitigating circumstance. The pursuit of aetiological expressivism might also reconstitute the text of judgment and its content. Perhaps judgments could refer more extensively to the biography and background of the perpetrator. Their length-already far too onerous-would not necessarily need to be extended. The detailed discussion of procedural backgrounds that appear in them, at times by rote, could, for example, be pared back.
115
International criminal law, however, also could take aetiological expressivism most seriously by not trying to accommodate it in a laundry list of reforms. Perhaps it is best for certain actors, survivors and perpetrators simply to lie beyond criminal law's remit and, in turn, be non-justiciable. 116 Law could respect imperfect victims and tragic perpetrators by staying away from them. Yet so long as the accoutrements of the criminal law-courtrooms, judgments and jailhouses-expand as the iconic way in which to imagine post-conflict justice and solemnly authenticate the past, non-justiciability leads to invisibility. And this invisibility simply exacerbates the 'ethical loneliness' experienced by many victims. It is open for law to resist the impulse to jump and speak; law need not always assert its primacy in constructed hierarchies of truths and memories. Law's silence-a juris silentium-can echo with listening and thereby encourage the dissemination of other stories of atrocity and support those vehicleswhether institutional or individual-that deliver them within a transitional justice paradigm.
117 The non-justiciable would then become visible. The 'ethical loneliness' of those who suffered the wrong kinds of harms might dissipate. Most immediately, the pursuit of aetiological expressivism might prompt international criminal law to engage differently with what it currently stylises as 'alternate' justice mechanisms-such as truth commissions 118 and ritualistic ceremonies-and approach them more as colleagues and less as foils, in particular, when these mechanisms memorialise the porousness of atrocity and the limits of judgment.
117 Thanks to Wouter Werner for introducing the concept of juris silentium to me.
118 For thoughtful discussion of how truth and reconciliation commissions, were they to discuss 'failing to resist', might engage Levi's 'gray zone', see B Leebaw, Judging State-Sponsored Violence, Imagining Political Change (Cambridge UP, 2011) 147-56.
